Android APK Checklist

This checklist complements the OWASP Mobile Application Security Testing Guide; apply each item according to the application’s threat model and authorized test scope.^[5]

Learn Android fundamentals

• Basics
• Dalvik & Smali
• Entry points
  • Activities
  • URL Schemes
  • Content Providers
  • Services
  • Broadcast Receivers
  • Intents
  • Intent Filter
• Other components
• How to use ADB
• How to modify Smali

Static Analysis

• Check for obfuscation, root/emulator detection, and anti-tampering checks. Read this for more information.
• Sensitive applications (like bank apps) should check if the mobile is rooted and should actuate in consequence.
• Search for interesting strings (passwords, URLs, API, encryption, backdoors, tokens, Bluetooth uuids…).
  • Special attention to firebase APIs.
• Read the manifest:
  • Check if the application is in debug mode and try to “exploit” it
  • Check if the APK allows backups
  • Exported Activities
    • Unity Runtime: exported UnityPlayerActivity/UnityPlayerGameActivity with a unity CLI extras bridge. Test -xrsdk-pre-init-library <abs-path> for pre-init dlopen() RCE. See Intent Injection → Unity Runtime.^[1]
  • Content Providers
  • Exposed services
  • Broadcast Receivers
  • URL Schemes
• Is the application saving data insecurely, internally or externally?
• Is any password hard-coded or saved on disk? Is the app using insecure cryptographic algorithms?
• Are all native libraries compiled as PIE where the platform requires it?
• Use static Android analyzers to complement manual review.
• android:exported mandatory on Android 12+ – misconfigured exported components can lead to external intent invocation.
• Review Network Security Config (networkSecurityConfig XML) for cleartextTrafficPermitted="true" or domain-specific overrides.
• Look for calls to Play Integrity / SafetyNet / DeviceCheck – determine whether custom attestation can be hooked/bypassed.
• Inspect App Links / Deep Links (android:autoVerify) for intent-redirection or open-redirect issues.
• Identify usage of WebView.addJavascriptInterface or loadData*() that may lead to RCE / XSS inside the app.
• Analyse cross-platform bundles (Flutter libapp.so, React-Native JS bundles, Capacitor/Ionic assets). Dedicated tooling:
  • flutter-packer, fluttersign, rn-differ
• Scan third-party native libraries for known CVEs (e.g., libwebp CVE-2023-4863, libpng, etc.).
• Evaluate SEMgrep Mobile rules, Pithus and the latest MobSF ≥ 3.9 AI-assisted scan results for additional findings.
• Check OEM ROM add-ons (OxygenOS/ColorOS/MIUI/OneUI) for extra exported ContentProviders that bypass permissions; try content query --uri content://com.android.providers.telephony/ServiceNumberProvider without READ_SMS (e.g., OnePlus CVE-2025-10184).^[2]

Dynamic Analysis

• Prepare the environment (online, local VM or physical)
• Is there any unintended data leakage (logging, copy/paste, crash logs)?
• Confidential information being saved in SQLite dbs?
• Exploitable exposed Activities?
• Exploitable Content Providers?
• Exploitable exposed Services?
• Exploitable Broadcast Receivers?
• Is the application transmitting information in clear text/using weak algorithms? is a MitM possible?
• Inspect HTTP/HTTPS traffic
  • This one is really important, because if you can capture the HTTP traffic you can search for common Web vulnerabilities (Hacktricks has a lot of information about Web vulns).
• Check for possible Android Client Side Injections (probably some static code analysis will help here)
• Frida: Just Frida, use it to obtain interesting dynamic data from the application (maybe some passwords…)
• Test for Tapjacking / Animation-driven attacks (TapTrap 2025) even on Android 15+ (no overlay permission required).^[3][4]
• Attempt overlay / SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW clickjacking and Accessibility Service abuse for privilege escalation.
• Check if adb backup / bmgr backupnow can still dump app data (apps that forgot to disable allowBackup).
• Probe for Binder-level LPEs (e.g., CVE-2023-20963, CVE-2023-20928); use kernel fuzzers or PoCs if permitted.
• If Play Integrity / SafetyNet is enforced, try runtime hooks (Frida Gadget, MagiskIntegrityFix, Integrity-faker) or network-level replay. Recent Play Integrity Fix forks (≥17.x) embed playcurl—focus on ZygiskNext + PIF + ZygiskAssistant/TrickyStore combinations to regain DEVICE/STRONG verdicts.
• Instrument with modern tooling:
  • Objection > 2.0, Frida 17+ (Android 16 support, ART offset fixes), NowSecure-Tracer (2024)
  • Dynamic system-wide tracing with perfetto / simpleperf.
• For OEM telephony/provider bugs (e.g., OxygenOS CVE-2025-10184), attempt permission-less SMS read/send via the content CLI or in-app ContentResolver; test blind SQLi in update() to exfiltrate rows.^[2]

Some obfuscation/Deobfuscation information

• Read here

References

• [1] CVE-2025-59489 – Arbitrary Code Execution in Unity Runtime (blog)
• [2] Rapid7: CVE-2025-10184 OnePlus OxygenOS Telephony provider permission bypass
• [3] This new Android attack could trick you into compromising your own phone (Tom’s Guide, on TapTrap)
• [4] TapTrap: Animation-Driven Tapjacking on Android (TU Wien / USENIX Security 2025)
• [5] OWASP Mobile Application Security Testing Guide - Android